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Lawrence KornreIch & aLexander I. PLaTT
The Temptation of Martinez v. Ryan:  
Legal Ethics for the Habeas Bar1
I. InTroducTIon
I
n Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court opened a new 
route for convicted defendants to obtain habeas relief.2 
A defendant whose first-tier state habeas counsel failed 
to adequately challenge the ineffectiveness of his trial 
counsel— in jurisdictions where that is the first opportunity to 
do so—will now be able to raise that ineffectiveness claim in a 
subsequent federal habeas proceeding.3 Martinez allows a fed-
eral habeas petitioner to avoid 
losing this claim through proce-
dural default if he successfully 
asserts that (1) the ineffective-
ness of his state habeas counsel 
was the “cause”4 of his failure 
to raise the ineffectiveness of 
his trial counsel during first-tier 
state post-conviction proceed-
ings, and (2) his trial counsel 
was, in fact, ineffective under 
Strickland v. Washington.5 
Though the Court did not 
recognize a constitutional right 
to effective counsel on collateral review, it ensured that ineffective 
state habeas counsel would not prevent a defendant from raising 
claims about constitutionally ineffective trial counsel on federal 
collateral review.6
By introducing a new category of eligible claims reviewable 
in federal habeas proceedings, however, the Court also introduced 
a new and difficult choice for certain convicted defendants as 
their cases move along the procedural path from state to federal 
habeas review.7 Because many habeas lawyers represent their 
clients across both state and federal habeas proceedings,8 and 
because these lawyers must adhere to ethical rules that prohibit 
conflicts of interest in their representation,9 many clients in 
Martinez’s position will be forced to choose whether (a) to retain 
their state habeas counsel through subsequent post-conviction 
appeals and forego a possible Martinez claim, or (b) to pursue 
a federal habeas Martinez claim with new counsel.10 With this 
choice for habeas litigants come important and difficult ethical 
questions for the habeas bar: Is it possible to advise a client 
regarding a claim based on one’s own ineffectiveness without 
committing an ethics violation? Can a client provide informed 
consent with respect to his lawyer’s conflict in order to receive 
the lawyer’s advice about making this choice, or is it necessary 
to bring in outside counsel to advise the client?
To a habeas bar already burdened by extreme resource 
scarcity and exacting procedural and timing requirements, 
Martinez adds yet another potential source of friction between 
effective representation and professional ethical responsibilities. 
Due to the additional costs entailed in complying with ethical 
standards, individual lawyers 
and those who set the rules that 
govern them may be tempted to 
loosen these rules in the name of 
access to justice.11 This would 
be a mistake. To preserve the 
integrity and autonomy of the 
legal profession, this temptation 
must be resisted.12
This Article aims to alert 
the habeas bar to the ethical 
responsibilities implicated 
by the Martinez decision and 
to provide guidance for what 
counsel must do when pre-
sented with Martinez situations to comply with professional 
ethical obligations. It proceeds in three parts. Part II reviews 
Martinez and the new category of claims that convicted defen-
dants may now bring on federal habeas review. Part III explores 
the two conflicts of interest created by the Martinez decision. 
It shows the reach of these conflicts by surveying the structure 
of the habeas bar and relates these conflicts to similar ones that 
exist at other procedural stages in criminal defense. Part IV sug-
gests steps that habeas counsel should take to comply with their 
ethical obligations in light of these conflicts.
II. raIsIng IneffecTIve-assIsTance- 
of-TrIaL-counseL cLaIms In federaL haBeas 
afTer marTInez
A federal judge may not issue a writ of habeas corpus free-
ing a state prisoner “if an adequate and independent state-law 
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ground justifies the prisoner’s detention.”13 “One ‘state ground’ 
often asserted,” in justifying detention is “a state-law ‘procedural 
default,’ such as the prisoner’s failure to raise his federal claim 
at the proper time.”14 However, the state court’s assertion of a pro-
cedural ground for default does not bar the assertion of the federal 
claim “where the prisoner had good ‘cause’ for not following the 
state procedural rule and was ‘prejudiced’ by not having done so.”15
In Murray v. Carrier, the Court determined that a lawyer’s 
constitutionally inadequate performance on direct appeal could 
amount to a cause sufficient to overcome a procedural default.16 
But in Coleman v. Thompson, the Court found that since “[t]here 
is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings . . . a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally inef-
fective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”17 That opinion 
concluded, therefore, that a habeas lawyer’s error in post-convic-
tion proceedings, even one that were to fall below the Strickland 
standard, could never be constitutionally ineffective.18
Martinez carved out an exception to Coleman.19 Where 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating to coun-
sel’s conduct during trial or direct appeal can only initially 
be brought in state habeas proceedings, lawyer error in those 
state habeas proceedings can now constitute cause, excusing a 
procedural default.20 Martinez applies only to claims that could 
not be raised prior to an “initial-review collateral proceeding.”21 
With respect to such claims, if either (1) the state courts did not 
appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, or 
(2) the appointed counsel was ineffective under the Strickland 
standard,22 then a procedural default will not bar a federal ha-
beas court from hearing those claims.23
“To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate 
that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim 
is . . . substantial.”24 In response, the state can raise the defense 
that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is “wholly 
without factual support, or that the lawyer in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding did not perform below constitutional stan-
dards.”25 The Martinez majority insisted, over Justice Scalia’s 
objections,26 that its decision did not establish a constitutional 
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.27 Rather, in the 
majority’s view, a state can either provide effective counsel in 
initial-review collateral proceedings or give up its procedural 
default defense in federal habeas.28
Martinez opens up a new category of claims for prisoners 
seeking collateral relief. The next part begins to examine the 
ethical implications of this development.
III. Martinez’s Two confLIcTs of InTeresT
Imagine the following scenario. Lawyer “L” routinely 
represents clients on collateral review across both state and 
federal habeas proceedings. L represents a client who 
recently lost on his initial-review collateral proceeding. In that 
proceeding, L did not raise any claim regarding the constitu-
tional ineffectiveness of her client’s trial counsel (“TC”). L is 
now preparing for federal habeas proceedings. Under Martinez, 
L may still obtain federal collateral relief based on the constitu-
tional ineffectiveness of TC by asserting that she was ineffective 
by failing to raise the claim on the initial-review proceeding, 
thereby avoiding procedural default.29
Martinez’s innovation is likely to be warmly received 
by those eager to see habeas clients add a new procedural 
arrow to their quivers.30 But the opinion also introduces a new 
dilemma for these litigants and their counsel—one that has 
gone unrecognized until now. A client in this situation now 
faces an extremely difficult decision about the next phase of his 
representation. He may either (a) find new counsel to pursue 
a Martinez claim in federal court based on L’s ineffectiveness 
in state habeas proceedings, or (b) keep L on as his lawyer and 
abandon his Martinez claim. 
This choice is unavoidable because L cannot argue her 
own ineffectiveness without facing an unwaivable conflict of 
interest.31 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide 
that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”32 A conflict exists 
where “there is a significant risk that the representation . . . 
will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.”33 
A lawyer has a personal interest in not being found to have 
performed ineffectively and in preserving her reputation as 
an effective practitioner. That interest, by definition, conflicts 
with the interests of a client asserting a claim based on his 
habeas lawyer’s prior ineffectiveness. As the comment to the 
Rule explains, “[I]f the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct 
in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or 
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”34 
Accordingly, many jurisdictions have held that a lawyer who 
enters representation in which she might be obliged to assert 
her own ineffectiveness necessarily encounters a conflict 
of interest.35
A strong presumption of a conflicted representation in 
this context is reinforced by the reality that a lawyer is simply 
“unlikely to raise a challenge to his or her own effectiveness.”36 
As one commentator/practitioner noted, lawyers are unlikely to 
embrace allegations of their own ineffectiveness because “[b]
eing second-guessed is not pleasant, and the impulse to defend 
one’s self is all too human.”37
Of course, “unlikely” is not synonymous with “never.” 
There are undoubtedly examples of dedicated defense coun-
sel vigorously pursuing their clients’ best interests by as-
serting their own prior ineffectiveness. It may even be the 
case that trial counsel has an ethical obligation to ensure that 
her present client will later be able to raise the best possible 
Criminal Law Brief 3
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by documenting all 
strategic choices in the course of the representation.38
However, the ethical rule against conflicted representation 
reflects a deeper concern. Unlike “other ethical or representa-
tional failures, which are discrete and whose effects are manifest 
and readily measured, a conflict of interest casts a shadow over 
every aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.”39 Even where 
a selfless counsel does assert her own prior ineffectiveness on 
behalf of a client, her conflict of interest with respect to this 
claim may still affect the quality of her advocacy on behalf of 
that claim. It might lead her to pay more attention to alterna-
tive claims or to pursue the claim with less zealousness. These 
effects are hard to measure. As the Supreme Court stated, the 
“evil” posed by conflicted representation is “in what the advo-
cate finds himself compelled to 
refrain from doing . . . [a]nd to 
assess the impact of a conflict 
of interests on the attorney’s 
options, tactics, and deci-
sions . . . would be virtually 
impossible.”40 This rationale 
is echoed by the restatement 
(third) of laW governing 
laW, which notes that “[e]ven 
if a lawyer could subordinate 
significant personal interests 
to the interests of clients, it 
is difficult to determine after 
the fact whether a lawyer had 
succeeded in keeping a client’s 
interests foremost.”41 Because 
of the difficulty in finding 
concrete evidence of conflicted 
behavior, a broad prophylactic 
rule against conflicted repre-
sentation is necessary to ensure that a “lawyer’s own interests 
[are] not . . . permitted to have an adverse effect on representa-
tion of a client.”42
Many jurisdictions have gone so far to hold that the conflict 
extends to situations where a different lawyer from the same 
office is faced with the possibility of raising an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim about her colleague.43 Under these 
principles, if L’s client wanted to pursue a Martinez claim, L 
would face a conflict of interest in advocating that claim and so 
would any firm colleague of L.44
In fact, the conflict extends even further: not only would 
it affect L’s ability to litigate her client’s Martinez claim in 
federal court based on her own ineffectiveness on state habeas, 
but it would also affect L’s ability to advise her client about 
making the choice about how to proceed.45 L’s personal interest 
in not being found ineffective means that she cannot provide 
conflict-free advice to her client about whether or not to pursue 
a Martinez claim.
For example, as one commentator argues, when a client 
approaches her former trial counsel for advice regarding a pro 
se habeas petition involving an ineffective assistance claim 
regarding the trial counsel’s own conduct, that lawyer “should 
refrain from giving any legal advice other than the advice to 
obtain counsel.”46 A parallel conflict arises after Martinez for 
state habeas counsel and their clients.
Martinez presents client and counsel with serious obstacles 
stemming from two conflicts of interest: (1) a conflict with 
respect to any Martinez claim based on the lawyer’s own inef-
fectiveness; and (2) a conflict with respect to any advice to her 
client as to whether he should or should not pursue that claim. 
Before turning to examine 
what ethical obligations fol-
low, this Article briefly pauses 
to consider two points: (1) how 
these conflicts will actually 
arise in habeas litigation; and 
(2) the relationship to similar 
conflicts at other stages of 
criminal defense litigation.
On the first point, despite 
the paucity of statistical data 
on the subject, it is likely that 
a substantial subset of habeas 
lawyers—and their clients—
will confront the ethical 
dilemma outlined above. The 
habeas bar is comprised of 
court-appointed and privately 
retained lawyers.47 Though 
most federal habeas petitions 
proceeded without any coun-
sel,48 the first major study of federal habeas cases since the 
Antiterorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was 
enacted found that capital petitioners are substantially more 
likely to have counsel than non-capital petitioners,49 and 
that for both capital and non-capital cases, habeas counsel is 
comprised of a mixture of both court-appointed and privately 
retained counsel.50 Over the last several decades, a robust 
private bar comprised of law-firm pro-bono,51 specialized 
non-profits,52 and legal clinics53 have taken on representation 
of many capital defendants in both state and federal post-
conviction proceedings. Court-appointed lawyers may be 
more likely to practice only in one venue and only as long as 
their court-appointment lasts. In contrast, this private pro-bono 
bar frequently represents clients across both state and federal 
habeas claims because continuity of representation is regarded 
as valuable to both client and counsel.54
In fact, the conflict extends even 
further: not only would it affect 
L’s ability to litigate her client’s 
Martinez claim in federal court 
based on her own ineffectiveness 
on state habeas, but it would also 
affect L’s ability to advise her 
client about making the choice 
about how to proceed.
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Unfortunately, anything more than anecdotal support as to 
the prevalence of cross-systemic habeas representation is dif-
ficult, not only because of the lack of data, but because the prac-
tices and composition of any particular habeas bar depends on 
highly localized factors. These factors include, legal rules about 
whether and which petitioners are entitled to court-appointed 
counsel,55 or institutional factors such as whether a local public 
defender offers habeas representation.56 But no further specific-
ity is necessary. Some subset of habeas counsel will find itself 
facing the ethical dilemma created by Martinez. This article 
provides ethics advice for this subset.
On the second point, while the conflicts raised by Martinez 
are new to this stage of the procedural posture, they are not 
altogether new to criminal defense. In jurisdictions where 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may be raised initially 
on direct appeal, or in post-trial motions, trial counsel and client 
have long faced a similar dilemma. 57 Indeed, all of the case law 
previously cited for the proposition that a lawyer cannot argue 
his own ineffectiveness comes out of such cases.58
The conflicts created by Martinez are nonetheless worthy 
of attention for two reasons. First, flagging the conflict will help 
lawyers avoid being caught by surprise. Without notice of the 
post-Martinez ethical landscape, lawyers may engage in unin-
tentional ethical violations. While jurisdictions have developed 
case law and practices regarding conflicts on direct appeals,59 
the novelty of the Martinez conflict generates a risk that law-
yers will fail to pay attention to their ethical obligations unless 
they are made aware of the conflicts the case presents. Second, 
the novelty of the conflicts creates an opportunity to develop 
practices and rules that conform to ethical professional values, 
rather than merely the strong pull of on-the-ground realities. By 
drawing attention to this conflict in the immediate aftermath 
of the Martinez decision, before rules or practices have taken 
hold, this article hopes to help shape the development of those 
practices around an awareness of the conflict and a respect for 
the ethical duties of counsel.
With this framework in mind, the next part turns to provide 
ethics advice to the subset of habeas lawyers that is likely to 
face this new conflict in the post-Martinez era.
Iv. recommendaTIons To The Bar
The Model Rules allow representation to go forward de-
spite conflicts of interest, but this does not resolve the ethical 
dilemma framed by Martinez. The Rules distinguish between 
waivable and unwaivable conflicts.60 Rule 1.7(b) provides that 
a conflicted lawyer may still represent a client if “the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide com-
petent and diligent representation,” “the representation is not 
prohibited by law,” and “[the] client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.”61 Any lawyer who finds herself in L’s 
position should proceed by asking herself whether these re-
quirements can be met in her situation.
The first conflict is the question of whether the lawyer can 
proceed to actually litigate the Martinez claim based on her own 
prior ineffectiveness by obtaining informed written consent of 
her client. Some jurisdictions seem to have explicitly prohibited 
such representation, recognizing it as a per se prejudicial con-
flict.62 In those jurisdictions the conflict would be unwaivable 
since it is “prohibited by law.”63
But, absent such express prohibition—or in those juris-
dictions where it is ambiguous64—would it be possible for a 
lawyer to “reasonably believe[] that [she] will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation” despite the conflict?65
We believe the answer should be no. As discussed above, 
even if a lawyer might proceed with a claim based on her own 
ineffectiveness, courts have recognized reasons to suspect that 
she would not pursue that claim as vigorously, or might devote 
more attention to alternative claims.66 Because of these dif-
ficulties in monitoring the representation and the fundamental 
nature of the conflict of interest, it is unreasonable to think that 
a lawyer will be able to assess her own errors and argue that her 
actions fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.67
Insofar as a lawyer cannot competently and diligently 
advance an argument based on her own ineffectiveness, what 
should the lawyer do about the second conflict: how to advise 
the client regarding the choice he now faces between retaining 
counsel and abandoning the Martinez claim, or pursuing the 
claim with new counsel?
Because the lawyer is conflicted in this situation, once 
again, the question is whether she can “reasonably believe” 
that she will be able to provide “competent and diligent rep-
resentation” in the course of providing the advice. If so, then 
she may counsel her client about this choice after obtaining 
informed written consent.68 If not, then she must bring in outside 
counsel to provide this advice and can only continue with the 
non-Martinez representation in federal habeas after her client 
makes an informed decision to abandon that claim on the basis 
of consultation with outside counsel.69
Again, the answer should be no—and for similar reasons. 
For professional or reputational reasons, it is unlikely that a 
lawyer would be able to provide detached and unbiased advice 
regarding a claim based on her own inadequacy. Due to the fun-
damental nature of this conflict, it is not possible for a lawyer to 
“reasonably believe” that she will be able to provide “competent 
and diligent representation.”70 Thus, she should bring in outside 
counsel to review the record and advise the client about whether 
to pursue this claim.71
To summarize: After Martinez, when a lawyer fails to 
completely raise a possible ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim on first-tier collateral proceedings (i.e., she was arguably 
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ineffective), she has an ethical obligation to bring in outside 
counsel to review the record below and advise her client regarding 
the merits of such a claim. And, if her client chooses to go for-
ward with this Martinez claim, he must use new counsel to do so.
v. concLusIon: The TemPTaTIon of Martinez
Even though Martinez adds an arrow to the quiver of con-
victed defendants seeking collateral relief, it also introduces 
new difficulties for both the habeas bar and its clients.
Martinez, therefore, has the perhaps surprising consequence 
of imposing substantial new burdens on habeas counsel and on 
habeas petitioners themselves. Significant time and money must 
be spent on bringing in a lawyer to review the record and advise 
the client as to his choices. Time and money which might have 
been spent litigating claims must be devoted to ensuring clients 
receive conflict-free representation. Even as Martinez opened 
one door to federal habeas, it may have closed another.
To a habeas bar already burdened by extreme professional 
challenges owing to a lack of resources, a maze of onerous 
and rigid procedural hurdles, and incarcerated clients who are 
often difficult to reach, the Martinez decision adds an additional 
professional obligation. To an already disempowered and vul-
nerable clientele of habeas petitioners, Martinez poses a new 
and potentially troubling dilemma regarding the future course 
of their representation: give up your current habeas counsel and 
try to find a new lawyer in the hopes of raising a new claim in 
federal court, or continue with the current relationship at the 
cost of foregoing that potential claim.
These dilemmas are difficult for both counsel and client. 
They add new pressure on the system of habeas representation 
and may create a temptation to loosen the ethical obligations 
in the name of enhancing access to justice—both by practicing 
lawyers and by those who set the rules that govern them.
Lawyers should resist this temptation. The ethical 
obligations imposed on lawyers should not be sacrificed 
for enhanced efficiency. These obligations serve deeper values. 
Compromising on professional ethical responsibilities would 
undercut lawyers’ tradition of self-regulation, and with it, the 
important values served by an independent legal profession. 
As the Preamble to the Model Rules explains:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their 
professional calling, the occasion for government reg-
ulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain 
the legal profession’s independence from government 
domination. An independent legal profession is an  
important force in preserving government under law, 
for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged 
by a profession whose members are not dependent on 
government for the right to practice.72
Even as the ethical challenges of habeas proceedings grow 
more complex, lawyers have a duty to continue to provide zealous 
representation—bearing in mind that whatever the procedural 
changes, for their clients, the stakes remain as high as ever.
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